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Taking Stock of Newspapers and Their Future
1

Randall P. Bezanson
2
Gilbert Cranberg
I. INTRODUCTION

In this essay, we will touch upon many subjects that are contributing to
the changing face of daily newspapers in the United States. We begin with
a brief and conclusory definition of editorial freedom in news, the foundation of journalism, and the key to its educational function in the news setting. We will then turn to markets, technology, economics, organization of
the news firm, operation of the newsroom, and the changing definition of
news. Our purpose is to identify deep changes that are occurring in the
nature and institutions of news, changes that will continue to evolve in unforeseeable but perhaps controllable ways as the Twenty-first Century unfolds.
* * *
Editorial freedom is at the very heart of news as we know it. Editorial
freedom has only partly to do with government. But it has everything to do
with journalism. It is not a negation of government’s authority to intermeddle, but an affirmation of what freedom journalism, at least when it comes
to news, must enjoy.
Journalism is a human creation. It is not a part of the natural order of
things, but instead stems from the economic necessities of the news business and the news industry. Journalism rests on a central idea: that judgments about what is important and what people need to know must be made
in the middle distance between the whim of an owner and the will of an
audience. Journalism’s idea is independence from the owner and the audience, not just (or even primarily) independence from the government. This
independence makes possible the making of judgments about what is important and why, about what people need to know, not just what they might
wish to know.
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II. CHANGING MARKETS FOR DAILY NEWS
Let us turn, first, to the market.
Over many years we have studied the newspaper industry and the influence, if any, of changing economic, technological, and structural owner3
ship forces on news. Our interest is in what the market looks like, how it
works . . . and ultimately what effect, if any, the market is having on news
judgment. Here are some of the things we have discovered while rummaging around in the news business and the newspaper industry.
Newspapers are losing circulation. And they are fat and happy, by and
large (at least if they are smart). Years ago the Des Moines Register held a
retreat—back in 1979 or so, when it was a real and good newspaper. One
of the big subjects discussed was whether to wrap the classified ads and
sports sections in the Editorial section of the Sunday paper. This was all
about bundling—creating a department store of news in the newspaper.
People would have to see and touch the editorial stuff, at least. The Register took seriously its obligation to make people see what they needed. It
was a big, brazen, independent, statewide newspaper, in the finest of traditions—a great department store.
Today the Register’s retreats are likely dominated by discussions about
strategic circulation reductions, about increasing the ratio of advertising to
newshole, about sponsoring public meetings, not covering them. The Register has purposefully shed its rural circulation. The State market, it has
concluded, is too diverse. Advertisers won’t pay for rural circulation; it’s
not part of the desired demographic. The Register’s advertising today is in
the Des Moines metropolitan area; its circulation is cut back to that area; its
news content is refocused on Des Moines.
This is a result of a shift in the economies of the newspaper business,
from high fixed costs to low fixed costs, from low variable costs to high
variable (labor) costs. And it is a result of the profit potential that lies in
small markets where costs can be cut, circulation decreased, and revenues
4
increased, all at once.

3
See, e.g., GILBERT CRANBERG, RANDALL BEZANSON & JOHN SOLOSKI, TAKING STOCK:
JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY (2001) [hereinafter TAKING STOCK];
RANDALL P. BEZANSON, HOW FREE CAN THE PRESS BE? (2003); Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90
IOWA L. REV. 887 (2005) [hereinafter Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth]; Randall P. Bezanson,
The Structural Attributes of Press Freedom: Private Ownership, Public Orientation, and Editorial
Independence, in JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER PRIVACY 17-57 (Craig L. LaMay ed., 2003);
Randall P. Bezanson, The Atomization of the Newspaper: Technology, Economics and the Coming
Transformation of Editorial Judgments About News, 3 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175 (1998) [hereinafter Atomization of the Newspaper]; RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG & JOHN SOLOSKI, LIBEL
LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY (1987).
4
See Atomization of the Newspaper, supra note 3, at 212-21.
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Minority circulation is being shed. Some call it newspaper redlining.
A very big metropolitan daily in the Midwest is reported to be purposefully
shedding minority circulation (south side of town). The paper can make
more money without the minority subscription base. Like the Des Moines
Register, it can save printing, circulation costs, increase ad rates and numbers, and increase subscription price and revenues. It can decrease costs,
because the minority community doesn’t need coverage if it is not being
served; and, the economies of scale—fixed costs low, variable (labor) costs
high—disfavor large size serving of a diverse news market; instead, it is
better to be small and concentrate content to a homogeneous demographic—and hopefully an upscale one.
Joel Kramer, then the Minneapolis Star Tribune publisher, said (after
the paper posted a four percent circulation loss following a thirty-two percent price hike): “We are a healthier business . . . if we are charging readers
6
more and accepting a somewhat smaller circulation.” Especially if the
small reader demographic is upscale.
The chief economist for the Newspaper Association of America said,
not too long ago, "We're in the business of delivering eyeballs to advertisers." Much of the decline in newspaper penetration, the NAA has said, is
7
“self-induced by solid business decisions.” The NAA’s 1995 Report to its
members gives the following advice: “Eliminate ‘fringe circulation’” that
provides little value to advertisers (read: minority, poor); focus on quality of
circulation, not on quantity (read: upscale): the quality customer pays on
time, preferably in advance, and is a steady subscriber; and aggressively
price. “Low-income areas,” the NAA chief economist said, “are not where
8
you concentrate efforts.”
III. CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES OF NEWS
Technology is conspiring with economic forces to narrow the range of
discretion enjoyed by editors and reporters, and in its stead to place increasing editorial judgment in the hands of readers, and soon perhaps in the
hands of computer intelligence that will exercise readers’ editorial judgment
for them without their knowing it, and without their knowing what they are
missing. Technology and economics are thus conspiring to wrest editorial
control over news content and news selection from journalism.
Here’s an example of the potential technology offers: Netflix.com. If
you haven’t been there, we encourage you to go. There you will be asked
5
Gilbert Cranberg, Trimming the Fringe: How Newspapers Shun Low-Income Readers, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 52.
6
Id.
7
Id. (discussing NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1995 CIRCULATION FACTS, FIGURES
AND LOGIC).
8
Id.
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to rate a few movies you have seen. Based on your rating, Netflix.com will
tell you which movies you are likely to like, and which you won’t like. As
you see movies, and rate them, Netflix gets smarter: better at knowing your
likes and dislikes, better at making recommendations for you (which are,
really, from you), better at telling you what not to see by never telling you
about it. It’s kind of an epistemological miracle, an out of mind experience.
A similar program, more powerful, has been tested in the newspaper
9
market in research studies at MIT. The MIT work involves not only individual preferences for news content, balance, and coverage, but also develops demographic screens that select in and out news material based on racial, gender, age, educational, economic, regional, and other characteristics.
Of course Moviecritic only gets smarter because the individual user rates
more and more movies. But with newspapers over the internet, rating by
the customer is not needed. The computer will just record your actual preferences reflected in your clicks, your printing instructions, and your searching habits and internalize that experience into an even better approximation
of your mind, values, preferences, and prejudices. And something called
push technology lets the computer software do that without you ever having
10
to ask it to do so, or even wanting it to do so.
Where is the exercise of human judgment about what you need to
know? Where is the editor—that hard-bitten, cranky, cigar-chewing, heavy
drinking curmudgeon who you hire when you buy a newspaper? It is, after
all, the editor you buy, not the paper and print. What you get from this
technology would certainly not be a department store of news. Indeed, it
wouldn’t even be a boutique. It would be a sliver. Imagine, if you are a
good consumer, the competition to get content into your sliver, to get it to
pass through your tight screen, your epistemological template.
IV. CHANGING ECONOMICS OF NEWS
What's going on here? What's going on may be a revolution. A revolution being driven by a market (not, as some economists would have it, by
an idealized market), by fundamental technological and economic forces
that are changing the communication industry, and the business of news and
journalism, before our eyes. Much as these pieces of bad news seem disconnected and even cynical, they are not; they are part of a coherent whole,
a rational pattern. Here is what we see as the chief elements of the pattern:

9
See Mitchel Resnick, Distributed Constructionism, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
LEARNING SCIENCES 280-84 (Daniel C. Edelson & Eric A. Domeshek eds., 1996), discussed more
generally in Atomization of the Newspaper, supra note 3, at 188-94 (discussing atomizing editorial
judgments, Moviecritic, and the MIT research).
10
See Atomization of the Newspaper, supra note 3, at 188-94; J.D. Lasica, When Push Comes to
News, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 1997, at 32.
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– The mass market is dying. The economies of scale are reversing
themselves. Economies of scale in 1947 favored large size and mass markets; today they favor small scale and segmented markets.
– Large is not profitable. Small is.
– The market fragment—the niche, or target, in current parlance—is
the chief aim for economically motivated firms. In the fragment, costs can
be cut, volume reduced, content specialized, shaped by the preferences and
tastes of the demographic segment, and revenues and profits increased.
– Fragmentation has created the deeply ironic condition in which variety and diversity of expression is unprecedented when viewed across the
landscape of media, but in which, for any individual member of the audience, variety and diversity have been diminished. As consumers of news
we have more options (just look at the fifty to one hundred cable channels)
but we exercise few of them. In an age of plenty we starve.
– Barriers to entry are down. Fixed costs are down, variable costs up.
The key is strategy, not bulk.
– Control of media content—including news—has changed from topdown to bottom up. Concentrated ownership of newspapers in the hands of
chains has yielded standardized economic behavior and incentives at the
daily papers, but not standardized control of news content. Content is being
shaped from the bottom up—from the subscriber and the niche advertiser
assisted by the contact groups, market surveys, and devices of community
journalism now practiced, not by the centralized holding company management—they are not news people—but by the local newspaper, pursuant
to central corporate policy.
– New electronic news markets and firms are emerging. The current
manifestation of the new forces of economic scale—bottom up content
choice, fragmentation of news markets, and the economies of smallness—is
the blog. Five years ago the term blog was the province of a few internet
geeks. Today the number of blogs is in the millions. Blogs are specialized
spaces—politics, law, medicine, literature, cooking, and on and on—of information and opinion, and in the political blogosphere, mostly opinion.
They check the traditional news sources, especially national newspapers
and networks, now known as MSM (mainstream media). They challenge
facts, uncover facts and motives, offer different and competing opinions.
Many—perhaps even most in some segments—are ideologically or politically committed. Technology allows us, with blog sites, to indulge in reinforcing our own beliefs, if we wish, or to have them challenged. More often the former, perhaps.
V. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE NEWS FIRM
Consumers of journalism have been beleaguered in recent years by
two trends. When the trends intersect and overlap, as they do frequently,

18
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they are especially toxic to the public’s interest in accurate and comprehensive news and information.
A. Concentration and the Financial Markets
One of those trends, consolidation, has rapidly remade the face of the
communications industry. By one count, in 1983, most of the major media
11
outlets were concentrated in fifty corporations. Just nine years later, that
degree of control was in the hands of nine companies. By 2004, the urge to
12
merge had concentrated ownership in a mere five corporations.
Consolidation in broadcasting has given rise to Clear Channel Communications, the nation’s biggest broadcaster and a publicly traded power13
house with ownership of just over 1200 radio stations. A Clear Channel
executive described the company’s mission: “We’re not in the business of
providing news and information. We’re not in the business of providing
well-researched music. We’re simply in the business of selling our custom14
ers products.” Consolidation also gave birth to Sinclair Communications,
again publicly traded, which is among the largest U.S. owners of television
stations. Sinclair boasts a profit margin of forty per cent. Its CEO reported
to stockholders not long ago, “We continued to control and reduce costs by
eliminating non-core expenses and closing unprofitable news programs in
15
St. Louis and Greensboro, N.C.” Costs at the Sinclair-owned TV outlet in
Des Moines, Iowa, are controlled by maintaining a skeleton local news
crew and originating the nightly newscast 150 miles distant in Cedar Rapids; the same news program is aired to unsuspecting viewers in both cities.
Sinclair’s public file in Des Moines informs citizens curious about how the
station serves the public that it helps the community cope with drugs and
crime by broadcasting movies such as “Tequila Sunrise” and “Silence of the
16
Lambs.”
Takeovers usually involve acquisition costs, which frequently are financed in part by anticipated revenue gains, cost cuts, or both. When analysts commented on the recent impending sale of the Knight Ridder chain,
the nation’s second largest newspaper company, they said they expected the
sale to be accompanied by an attack on costs. Since the big-ticket items at
11

BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, at xxviii (4th ed. 1992).
BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 3 (2004).
13 THE PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2004 28
(2004), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2004/index.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
14 Christine Y. Chen, The Bad Boys of Radio, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 119 (quoting Clear
Channel CEO Lowry Mays).
15 SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP, 2001 Annual Report (2002) (“Letter to out Shareholders, unnumbered page before page 1), available at http://www.sbgi.net/annual_reports/sbgi2001.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2006).
16 Memorandum from Kelley Green to Channel 17 Public File (Apr. 9, 2002) (on file with author).
12
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newspapers are personnel and newsprint, shrinking staff and newshole inevitably would impact quality of the publications. The sale of Knight Ridder was triggered by dissatisfaction with the company’s stock price by institutional investors, a fact of corporate life not likely to be ignored by any
17
new publicly traded purchaser.
Knight Ridder papers were served by the chain’s highly regarded
Washington bureau; other publications also subscribe to the chain’s news
service. The bureau was widely admired by journalists, particularly for its
skeptical reporting on the build-up to the Iraq war. While others in the
Washington press corps also reported skeptically, challenges to the administration’s case for war in these dispatches usually were buried. The Knight
Ridder bureau stood out among the mainstream media by searching for
dissenting voices and presenting them prominently.
It remains to be seen whether the sale of Knight Ridder results in
weakening the Washington bureau. If so, that would be a loss for journalism and for the public’s need for a variety of sources of information. It
would mark a further, and significant, toll taken by the profit demands on
the publicly traded press. Earlier, Knight Ridder, in a futile effort to satisfy
Wall Street, had slashed payroll, including its international coverage. As
The New York Times described the cutbacks recently, “The bigger [Knight
Ridder] papers have done away with most of their prestigious foreign bureaus. A dozen years ago, The Philadelphia Inquirer had bureaus in Moscow, London, Rome, Jerusalem, South Africa, New Delhi and Berlin. Today, it has one correspondent in Jerusalem, having closed its only other
18
bureau in Rome . . . .”
The economic pressure on Knight Ridder to sell, despite the company’s nineteen percent profit margin, exemplifies the plight of the publicly
traded press, especially those segments of it that do not have strong family
ownership of a class of stock. The institutional investors who own most
newspaper company stock have, for the most part, far less interest in quality
journalism than in the quality of the financial statements.
We interviewed many of the most influential stock analysts who fol19
low the newspaper industry. When asked if going public has been good or
bad for journalism, the near-unanimous verdict that it has been harmful was
telling, particularly since the analysts have a financial interest in the decisions to go public. The view of the analysts, namely that going public
forced newspaper companies to become excessively focused on the bottom
line at the expense of quality journalism, is widely shared in newsrooms.
Gene Roberts, former editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, spoke for many
17 Katharine Q. Seelye, Weighing Knight Ridder Against Stubborn Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2005, at C1.
18 Id.
19 TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 56-63.
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journalists when he commented after leaving the Inquirer, “With the exception of a tiny handful of papers, the talk at the highest levels of newspapers
these days is of increasing profits, increasing corporate pressure, increasing
20
responsibility to shareholders.”
Note that Roberts spoke after he left the Inquirer. For obvious reasons, the toll taken by profit pressures seldom is articulated by working
journalists. Now and then retired journalists speak out, but not with notable
success. As for the public, consumers of news seldom are organized and
may not even be aware of a newspaper’s decline when it happens, as it frequently does, in undramatic incremental steps. The recent action by
MoveOn Media Action, an offshoot of MoveOn.org, to object to job cuts at
Tribune Company papers with petition drives and protest actions may have
21
inadvertently underscored how rarely citizen activism targets the press.
Cost-cutting has a price, and that price may include not only a less accurate and untrustworthy news report, but the cost of libel litigation due to
shorthanded newsrooms staffed by less experienced, inadequately trained
and over-worked personnel. Howard Tyner, former editor of the Chicago
Tribune, described the effects of belt-tightening this way: “There’s always a
price for being lean. . . . I have top people who are terrific, and here and
there I have deputies who are good. But it thins out real fast. And you can
see it in the paper. We make more mistakes than we did before. . . . [The
22
Tribune] would be edited . . . much better if we had more people there.”
When Leonard Downie Jr. and Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post complained that “[t]oo much of what has been offered as news in recent years
has been untrustworthy, irresponsible, misleading or incomplete,” they
fixed fault on newspaper management’s single-minded focus on maximiz23
ing profits.
This state of affairs led us recently to propose institutional liability for
news organizations in the libel setting. In the context of libel suits against
the press, if defamatory mistakes are made, and they give rise to litigation,
attention almost always focuses on newsroom error. We believe that is myopic. When policies adopted in executive suites have a knowing and direct
link to libelous stories, responsibility should be fixed where it belongs.
That means looking beyond the person whose fingers produced an offending story to those who created or tolerated the conditions—shorthanded
copy desks, overburdened editors, underpaid and insufficiently trained re-

20

Corporatism vs. Journalism, The Press-Enterprise Lecture Series, Number 31, Feb. 12, 1996, at

21

Katharine Q. Seelye, Group Says Tribune’s Cuts Hurt the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at

3.
C5.
22 LEONARD DOWNIE JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS: AMERICAN
JOURNALISM IN PERIL 84 (2002) (alteration in original).
23 Id. at 9.
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porters that made the libel all but a predictable accident waiting to happen.
Libel law needs to reflect the realities of bottom-line journalism today by
holding institutions responsible for the consequences when they pay exces24
sive heed to profits and share prices at the expense of their newsrooms.
For present purposes, however, the point is not our suggestion of institutional liability, but the underlying changes in the news business and its
markets—including the financial markets—that spurred the proposal.
Newspapers need advertising, but advertising needs good and valuable
journalism to attract the readers to the advertisements. Without good journalism and attention to its demands on behalf of the public, there will increasingly be less reason for individuals to seek their product information in
the newspaper, as opposed to the ubiquitous shoppers and the websites on
the internet. The business of newspapers must, at base, be news, not business.
25

B. Market Incentives Within the Firm

The market—particularly the financial market—has placed demands
on the operations of the newsroom in the public companies. And it has also
placed strategically located incentives on management and even, in the
form of stock options and financial bonuses, on editors and staff in the
newsroom itself.
Here are some statistics. As the Twenty-first Century began, twentyone percent of national daily newspaper circulation was owned by four
companies. Seventy-five percent of daily newspaper circulation in the
26
United States came from chains.
Newspapers are no longer family owned. They are owned by institutional investors. Indeed, newspapers are more heavily owned by large and
market driven institutional investors than any other major industrial group
in this country. In 1994 the large institutional investors owned about sixty
percent of the stock in the media giants, more than the average institutional
27
investor ownership in the largest 500 companies in the United States. The
ten largest institutional investors (Berkshire Hathaway, Loews, Equitable,
University of California Retirement Fund, etc.) owned forty-four percent of
CBS, and they owned on average twenty-five percent of the thirteen largest
media companies (Cap Cities, Gannett, Tribune, News Corp., Times Mirror,
28
Knight Ridder, Washington Post, New York Times, Dow Jones, etc.). In24

See generally Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth, supra note 3.
Material in this section draws upon and is in part excerpted from TAKING STOCK, supra note 3,
and Institutional Reckless Disregard for the Truth, supra note 3.
26 See generally TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 22-33 (discussing newspaper circulation and
ownership).
27 See generally id., at 17-72 (discussing publicly newspaper ownership and control).
28 See id., at 41-55 (discussing ownership and control of newspapers).
25
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stitutional investors owned 94 ninety-four percent of CBS stock in 1994. A
single institutional investor owned twenty percent of CBS, fifteen percent
29
of the Washington Post, and thirteen percent of Cap Cities/ABC. Institutional investors aren’t bad people . . . but they are sophisticated investors.
Institutional investors protect their stakes; they exert influence on business
objectives; they demand respect in the bottom line and insist on short-term
market returns.
What about the management of these media companies? Executive
management in these media firms possesses great business and financial
talent, but with few exceptions there is no news experience to be found in
the ranks of executive management or among outside directors.
And there are few if any incentives for the quality of journalism and
news within the compensation structure of the firm. Instead, incentives
(salary, bonus, options, and retirement system investments) are almost all
geared to the short term bottom line, to revenues, costs, and profits, and to
market performance of the holding company’s stock. These incentives now
penetrate into the newsroom of the newspapers owned by the company—to
the compensation of editors and reporters.
Revenues and profits are the goal to which all efforts bend. Revenues
mean advertisers. Advertisers thrive on purchasers. News is a vehicle for
delivering advertising. Give people what they want, not what they need.
The combination of consolidation and public ownership has powerfully concentrated the minds of media managers on maximizing profits. As
noted earlier, veteran Washington Post journalists Leonard Downie Jr. and
Robert G. Kaiser described the consequences:
Too much of what has been offered as news in recent years has been
untrustworthy, irresponsible, misleading or incomplete. . . .
Most newspapers have shrunk their reporting staffs, along with
the space they devote to news, to increase their owners’ profits. Most
owners and publishers have forced their editors to focus more on the
bottom line . . . .
If most newspapers have done poorly, local television stations
have been worse . . . . The national television networks have trimmed
their reporting staffs and closed foreign reporting bureaus to cut their
owners’ costs . . . .
. . . Most newspapers, television networks and local television
and radio stations now belong to giant, publicly owned corporations
far removed from the communities they serve. They face the unrelenting quarterly profit pressures from Wall Street now typical of Ameri-

29

Id.
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can capitalism. Media owners are accustomed to profit margins that
30
would be impossible in most traditional industries.
It has become almost a cliché among journalists to observe that, while
the press is a business, it is a different kind of business because of the informing role it plays in a democratic society. But when newspaper companies opted to go public, they declared in essence that they wanted to be
31
treated the same as any other enterprise in the marketplace.
Increasingly, media companies resemble and behave the same as any
other business; the composition of their boards of directors are indistinguishable from other corporate boards, and their compensation incentives
are no different from the proverbial manufacturer of widgets. In 2003, the
CEO of Gannett, the nation’s largest newspaper chain, received $1,600,000
32
in salary, $2,250,000 in bonus, and 400,000 stock options. The compensation, which is certainly not out of the norm for large consolidated media
33
companies, is justified by “the Company’s performance,” which means
shareholder return on investment, return on assets, return on equity, operating cash flow, operating income, stock price, and market value. Gannett
34
lauds its operating margins as “among the best in the industry.” The company’s proxy statement does not even mention the quality and strength of
journalism practiced in the newsrooms owned by Gannett. And as Gannett
applauds its investment performance, the Project for Excellence in Journalism, in discussing the state of journalism generally, describes “a difficult
35
environment—more pressure on people, less time to report stories.” Journalism is contributing to the bottom line of the large companies, not by improving journalism’s quality, but by sacrificing it.
A.J. Liebling’s famous statement can be updated to apply to the modern media manager: “The function of the press in society is to inform, but
its role is to make money. The [media executive’s] reaction, on being told
that he ought to spend some money on reporting distant events, is therefore
exactly that of the proprietor of a large, fat cow, who is told that he ought to
36
enter her in a horse race.”

30

DOWNIE JR. & KAISER, supra note 22, at 9-10.
TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 17–76.
32 Gannet Co, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 12-13 (Mar. 12, 2004), http://media.corporateir.net/media_files/irol/84/84662/reports/2004proxy.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
33 Id. at 11.
34 Id.
35 PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2004: AN
ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2004), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2004/narra
tive_overview_newsinvestment.asp?media=1 (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
36 A. J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 7 (1961).
31
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VI. CHANGING OPERATION OF THE NEWSROOM
Corporate strategy, cost efficiency, net revenue growth, and targeted
marketing are now the watchwords.
News staff is down. Newsholes are down. News coverage is down.
All newspapers are labor-intensive; many are also profit-driven. Efforts to improve balance sheets almost unavoidably affect staffing.
Whether managements opt for layoffs, buyouts, or trims by attrition, the net
effect of downsizing is to diminish the newsroom’s ability to “ride herd” on
error. Ironically, the most caring and generous of the measures, the buyout,
may be the riskiest because it encourages departure of the most experienced
employees—the senior staffers with institutional memory and familiarity
with the community that make them especially effective bulwarks against
error.
37
Newsrooms lost about 2200 employees between 1990 and 2003. The
observation by veteran former editor Gene Roberts that, while he has heard
of papers with reduced staff that improved, he has never seen one, is tell38
ing. In The News About the News, Leonard Downie Jr. and Robert Kaiser
described the critical importance of adequate staffing. “Adding employees
allows a paper’s ambitions to rise and gives all staff members more time to
do their job more carefully. Management that supports its journalists with
resources will bring out their very best. Managements that cut and squeeze
39
demoralize their people as they shortchange their readers.”
Incremental news coverage is discouraged: don't bore the reader with
repetition, don't spend time and effort until you know where a story is leading, even where it ends. Just report it after it’s over. It saves time, space,
personnel.
Public journalism is here. Be part of the community. Don't look for
bad news. Don't focus only on problems, but on solutions. Don't cover
public meetings, it tells us. Sponsor them, as Gene Roberts puts it.
Newspapers increasingly map their strategies by organizing focus
groups and conducting market surveys, all in the name of better news. To
us, this is like a lawyer taking a poll—a market survey—to decide whether

37 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, NEWSROOM EMPLOYMENT CENSUS, Table A
(2003), available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=1138 (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). Advertising
is the prime source of newspaper revenue. It tends to be cyclical, ebbing and flowing with the economy.
Newspapers often reduce staff in response to economic downturns, but many times they do not recoup
all of the staff losses during recovery, thereby creating a more or less permanent and heightened risk of
institutional indifference to journalism. See TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 24.
38 Interview with Gene Roberts (May 28, 2004); see generally LEAVING READERS BEHIND: THE
AGE OF CORPORATE NEWSPAPERING (Gene Roberts et al. eds., 2001).
39 Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth, supra note 3, at 895-96 (quoting LEONARD DOWNIE,
JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM IN PERIL 84 (2002)).
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and how to defend an unpopular client. By these steps news judgment is
given up, in invisible increments, to the reader.
The newspaper companies that are publicly traded must be mindful
both about the return to their investors and about the economic performance
of their peers. Few papers face newspaper competition in the communities
where they publish, but their parent corporations compete for investors in
the marketplace. Thus, profit margins are watched closely by stock analysts, and comparisons are made. As Knight Ridder CEO Anthony Ridder
ruefully noted, the analysts would “be much happier if we had Gannett mar40
gins; they’d jump with joy if we said we’d have Gannett margins . . . .”
The upshot is that the most profit-hungry companies, the ones most
heedless of the adverse consequences of cost-cutting on editorial standards,
affect not only their own newsrooms but also newsrooms elsewhere.
The bonuses and stock options at publicly traded newspaper companies are heavily weighted toward rewarding the achievement of financial
41
targets rather than improving quality. When Geneva Overholser was editor of the Gannett-owned Des Moines Register in the 1990s, her bonus objectives included this one established for her by corporate: “Help the company make budget by staying within extremely tight expense budgets, conserving newsprint and participating in intracompany efforts to become more
efficient. Stay within budgeted amounts for payroll (eliminating two posi42
tions and saving $100,000).”
That seems almost benign compared to what consultants recommended for the Winston-Salem (North Carolina) Journal, owned by the
publicly traded Media General company. The money-saving formula the
consultants devised directed that “[a]n A-1 [front-page] story should be six
inches or less. A reporter should use a press release and/or one or two ‘cooperative sources.’ He or she should take 0.9 hours to do each story and
43
should be able to produce 40 of these in a week.” The formula was widely
derided, and it was scrapped, but the consultant did succeed in trimming
44
twenty percent of the paper’s 600-person workforce.
While the Winston-Salem paper’s experience with by-the-numbersjournalism may have been an aberration, editors nowadays face heavy bottom-line pressure. Downie and Kaiser described their predicament:
[M]ost of the corporations that own newspapers are focused on profits, not journalism. Editors who once spent their days working with
reporters and editors on stories now spend more of their time in meet40

TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 58.
TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 577-107 (discussing “Organizational Behavior and Dynamics
in the Publicly Traded Newspaper firm”)
42 DOWNIE JR. & KAISER, supra note 22, at 94.
43 Id. at 97.
44 Id.
41
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ings with the paper’s business-side executives, plotting marketing
strategies or cost-cutting campaigns. Chain editors now routinely
45
have two titles: editor and vice president of a big corporation.
46

Advertising is the prime source of newspaper revenue. It tends to be
cyclical, ebbing and flowing with the economy. Newspapers often reduce
staff in response to economic downturns, but many times do not recoup all
of the staff losses during recovery, thereby creating more or less permanent
and heightened risk of institutional error.
The proverbial last line of newsroom defense against error traditionally has been the copy desk, but at many papers it has become a porous
defense. When page make-up formerly done in composing rooms shifted to
newsrooms, the task of electronic composition known as pagination frequently fell to copy editors, who became primarily paginators (electronic
47
page designers) and only incidentally, if at all, guardians against error.
The switch to pagination enabled newspaper companies to wipe out whole
composing rooms, whose employees usually were union members, while
the newsroom employees who replaced them usually were not organized.
Pagination increases the workload. By one estimate, it adds between a
shift and five shifts of staff time daily, depending on the size of the paper.
Unless staff is added to compensate for pagination, copy editing, and thus
48
accuracy, is bound to suffer. Flawed heads and error-laden copy that
emerge from copy desks too busy paginating to flag the errors and raise
questions about stories because the companies chose to improve the bottom
line, rather than add staff, are classic forms of institutional error.
Turnover explains much about what is wrong in newspapers. The
managing editor of the Sarasota Herald-Tribune admitted in a December
24, 2000 column to readers, “For the fourth time in five years, this newspaper is looking for a new Manatee County government reporter.” The editor
related how a school board member complained:
In the four years I’ve been on the board, we’ve had seven different
education writers from the Sarasota Herald-Tribune. By the time one
figured out what was going on, they were gone, and somebody else
was in there. We knew what was going on (with school budget prob49
lems). We talked about it, and it did not get reported.
Turnover limits experience, which is compounded when reporters are
inadequately trained to begin with. As Robert J. Haiman reported in a study
45

Id. at 68.
TAKING STOCK, supra note 3, at 24.
47 Id. at 53-55.
48 Id.
49 Rosemary Armao, Editorial, Herald-Tribune Is Trying Hard to Keep Continuity of Coverage,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 24, 2000 at 38.
46
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for The Freedom Forum, “Business, community and civic leaders say they
and their organizations often are covered by reporters who simply do not
know enough about the subjects they are trying to report on. Inability to
50
report with authority was cited repeatedly as a problem . . . .”
Various sources told Haiman:
‘The reporters just come and go; by the time they learn something
about us they are shifted to another beat.’ . . . ‘The stories she writes
about us are so oversimplified and distorted we’d rather not have any
coverage at all.’ . . . ‘Surely there must be one business reporter who
majored in economics instead of English?’ . . . ‘The sports reporters
seem to be experts about sports; how come the business reporters
aren’t experts about business?’ . . . ‘Too often, reporters haven’t bothered to do their homework; they’re unprepared and we’re spending all
of our time getting them up to speed on an issue.’ . . . ‘I know this
stuff can get a little complicated at times, but if he doesn’t understand
51
it, how can he make it understandable for his readers?’
Yet papers persistently downsize payroll, and thus encourage turnover,
even as they fail to invest sufficiently in training those who stay. When
poorly paid and trained reporters who lack background in the subjects they
cover produce stories riddled with errors, and they are insufficiently
checked by copyeditors and inadequately supervised by overworked editors, that is a recipe for institutional error, not to mention libel suits.
VII. CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF NEWS
Blogs as a whole—the blogosphere—are a new department store of
news and public opinion. But the analogy is in one crucial way wrong:
there is no single building or publication in which variety is presented
whether we like it or not. In the blogosphere we have a vast mall of small
specialized stores. Technology allows us to construct the contents of our
own department store by picking and choosing those shops and products we
like, assembling them in our “favorites,” for example, as a personal department store selling styles and subjects we prefer—with news, conservative
or liberal, brash or logical, fact or opinion, argumentative or reflective. And
as newspapers adapt to this technology and medium, they too will offer us
the mixtures we want, too.
Some people think that blogs are the future of news—both print and
broadcast. They seem exceedingly well adapted to the new economics of

50 Robert J. Haiman, Best Practices for Newspaper Journalists 23, available at
http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/diversity/bestpractices/bestpractices.pdf (last visited Aug.
10, 2006).
51 Id. at 23-24.
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news and to the consumers’ preference for control. But whether the future
is blogs or something else, content change and market atomization and customer/reader control are already here and spreading their influence. And
epistemological change—self-enforced limits on what we see and hear and
read, and thus what we know and what we can know—may not be far behind.
New social divisions are emerging. Markets are now being defined in
socioeconomic terms, and the art of targeting markets by publications, even
newspapers, has been greatly assisted by information technology—buying
habits, interests, income, wealth, jobs, etc. In this sense news has become a
very powerful delivery vehicle, and news can be, and is, couched to the
interests of the targeted audience. In this sense news is retribalizing us.
With the passing of newspapers’ news-shaping power in the mass
market, the capacity for news judgment independent of the owner has increased, but simultaneously the capacity for news judgment independent of
the market—independent of the advertiser and, ultimately, of the audience—has been undermined. The reversal of the economies of scale has
left a journalistic vacuum which, ineluctably, the readers, and the audienceoriented advertisers, have occupied.
When news is governed by the audience, we get what we want, not
what we need. When news is governed by focused advertisers, the gap between news and advertisement, between information and impression, between reason and emotion, narrows. Advertisements, it has been said, often
wrap up our emotions and give them back to us. Their content is like an
inert gas. It is not surprising, then, that the nature of media content, and
even news, begins to partake of qualities of inert gas.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE DISAPPEARING DAILY DEPARTMENT STORE OF
NEWS AND OPINION
The basic economic structure of the newspaper business is radically
52
reversing itself from that noted by the Hutchins Commission in 1947.
Editorial freedom in 1947 centered on enforcing a distance between the
editor and the owner. Today editorial freedom demands that we enforce a
distance between the editor and the reader.
In 1947 the newspaper was like a huge department store. Today it is
becoming a boutique. In 1947 the technology of news was bundling—
putting all sorts of stuff together in a single news product, a department
store for news. Today the technology of news is unbundling, the targeting
of audience and narrowing of its news, governed by the new economies of
small scale, rapid response, and market segmentation.

52
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In 1947 news technology was based on standardization and mass production. Today the technology is the technology of variety, of localism.
Then, it was the technology of hardware—printing presses, delivery vans.
Today, it is the technology of software, of computer-based production and
printing, of instantaneous communication, of localized production and advertising, and now, with the internet, of the individual’s power over content
and the shape of news received—soon, perhaps, even software’s power over
the individual’s preferences. Increasingly, news is news for our niche and
segment, adapted to our demographic, and ultimately adapted to what the
software learns about our behavior and choices. This is the age of artificial
intelligence, learning technology, push technology. It is also, we fear, the
beginning of an age of retribalization, a time when news will become, not
what some damned editor thinks is important for all of us to know, but instead a picture of the world as we wish it, as we see it in our own mind’s
eye. This represents an epistemological transformation, not just an economic or technological one.
Today news content is increasingly shaped by the advertiser and by the
audience, but in a segmented, and often demographically defined (and socioeconomically homogeneous) market, not a mass market. We don’t mean
the sentences in the stories, or even their slant. We mean, instead, the definition of what kinds of stories count as news, and how and why they count.
Advertiser and owner ideology is not the main problem, audience ideology
is.
* * *
Freedom of the press was the hard-fought victory in the people’s
struggle for current information that was cheap, available to everyone, use53
ful, needed, and selected without government influence. Freedom of the
press today is moving toward information that is expensive, restricted in
availability, specialized, wanted (not needed), and selected without government influence. The only common element is the lack of government
influence. But isn't that definition of "independent", when it comes to the
press, too narrow? Doesn't that definition disserve the idea of the journalist, the editor, making his or her own decision about what is important and
useful and generally needed—making the decision, most importantly, in
that middle distance between the whim of the owner and the will of the
audience?
We think so.
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